International Perspectives on Education, Religion and Law by Russo, Charles J.
University of Dayton
eCommons
Educational Leadership Faculty Publications Department of Educational Leadership
2014
International Perspectives on Education, Religion
and Law
Charles J. Russo
University of Dayton, crusso1@udayton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ecommons.udayton.edu/eda_fac_pub
Part of the Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research Commons, Educational
Leadership Commons, Education Economics Commons, Elementary and Middle and Secondary
Education Administration Commons, Higher Education Administration Commons, Other
Educational Administration and Supervision Commons, Special Education Administration
Commons, and the Urban Education Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Educational Leadership at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Educational Leadership Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.
eCommons Citation
Russo, Charles J., "International Perspectives on Education, Religion and Law" (2014). Educational Leadership Faculty Publications.
123.
http://ecommons.udayton.edu/eda_fac_pub/123
1 Does the Free Exercise of Religion 
Have a Future in the Marketplace of 
Public Education in the United States? 
Charles ]. Russo 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the first sixteen words of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, enacted in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, represent- / 
ing its first ten amendments, "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." ] Viewed 
synoptically, the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, respectively, as 
they have come to be known, contain an igherent conflict. On the one 
hand, Americans are free to believe what they wish. On the other hand, 
the Supreme Court and lower courts have made it equally as clear that if 
religious practices violate the law or have been stricken down as uncon-
stitutional, such as when school officials invite religious leaders or others 
to pray at graduation ceremonies or the government provides unaccept-
able forms of aid to students who attend religiously affiliated non-public 
schools, then individuals or groups can be restrained from acting on their 
religious convictions. 2 
The American judiciary has adopted a near schikophr~njc attltlH;\e toward 
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. For instance, the Supreme 
Court has passed through three stages with regard to the constitutionality 
of aid to religiously affiliated non-public schools and their students, largely 
allowing selected forms of assistance; the Court is currently in the third of 
these as it has looked favorably on providing assistance to religious schools 
and their students. Conversely, the Court has been consistently invalidated 
state-sponsored prayer and religious expression in public schools. The lack 
of judicial clarity in this area, coupled with what some interpret as judicial 
hostility, in preventing these practices, has led to the near banishment of 
religious activities in many public schools. This conflicted state of affairs 
with regard to the religion clauses resulted largely from the Court's inabil- v 
ity to create separate, distinct standards when dealing with the Establish-
ment and Free Exercise Clauses. 
Against this background, then, the remainder of this chapter, which is 
divided into three sections, serves as an introduction to a discussion of the 
status of religious freedom whether involving prayer and a variety of issues 
~~==========~~~========~---
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involving religious activities in schools in the United States. Although the 
second part of the book consists of chapters on the relationship between 
education, law, and religion in selected nations from around the world, this 
j chapter does not review the various interna.tional documents on religious freedom3 slllce Amencan courts are unwdllllg to apply them III domestic 
situations.4 Instead, the final chapter, which provides comparative analyses 
of the issues discussed herein will also refer to these documents. 
After a brief history of religious freedom in the United States in the mod-
ern era, beginning with Everson v. Board of Education,s wherein the Court 
upheld a statute from New Jersey permitting parents to be reimbursed for the 
cost of transporting their children to religious schools, this first part of the 
chapter briefly provides an overview on litigation that has shaped religious 
freedom in education in its variety of manifestations. The second section 
briefly reviews three recent Supreme Court cases that reached mixed out-
comes with regard to religious freedom. In the first of two disputes directly 
impacting on religion, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (Christian Legal 
Society),6 a divided Court arguably placed a severe restriction on religious 
freedom when it affirmed that officials at a public law school in California 
could implement a policy requiring an on-campus religious group to admit 
all comers from the student body, including those who disagreed with its 
beliefs, as a condition to becoming a recognized student organization. 
A year later, in the second case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
Hosanna-Tabor (Hosanna-Tabor, EEOC)/ a unanimous Court rejected 
the claim of the EEOC in relying on both religion clauses in prohibiting the 
government from applying generally applicable non-discrimination laws 
to the relationship between religious organizations and their ministers. As 
such, the Court gave a boost to religious freedom in recognizing that offi-
cials in a Lutheran school had the right to decide who qualifies as one of 
their ministers. 
These two cases, one restricting religious freedom, the other protecting 
this essential right, reflect the growing tension as the United States with 
regard to the status of religious freedom, the subject of the third part of this 
chapter. In a third case United States v. Windsor (Windsor),8 some of the 
Court's comments in striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 
which defined marriage as a union between one man and woman, should 
raise questions for defenders of religious freedom in a multi-cultural plural-
istic society. The chapter rounds out with a brief conclusion. 
BACKGROUND 
At the outset, it is important to note that this chapter does not advocate 
for direct forms of financial aid or for the inclusion of sectarian prayer and 
religious activities in public schools. Rather, this chapter maintains that the 
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courts, and educators, should adopt a more even-handed approach to reli-
gion, especially Christianity, when evaluating the constitutionality of such 
activities under Establishment and Free Exercise Clause analysis, recogniz- ..., / 
ing that allowing individuals the freedom to express their faiths is not the 
same as imposing a state religion. J 
Questions about the Supreme Court's even-handedness when dealing 
with religion can be traced to its reliance on the Jeffersonian metaphor of 
the 'wall of separation'9 between church and state. This notion of separa-
tion, which relies on wOLds tbat a.r.~not in the- Constitution and is at the 
heart of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, entered its 
educational lexicon as a kind of Trojan horse in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation (Everson).l0 
In Everson, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Hugo Black, a for-
mer member of the Ku Klux Klan and its virulently anti-Catholic attitudes,!1 
upheld a statute from New Jersey that allowed local school boards to reim-
burse parents for the cost of transporting their children to religiously affili-
ated non-public schools. In so doing, an argument can be made that in light 
of his attitude towards Roman Catholicism, Black sowed the seeds for a Tro-
jan Horse of sorts in taking the first step toward the erection of the "wall 
of separation" between church and when he wrote that "[i]n the words of 
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State."'12 
The Supreme Court has relied on this fateful metaphor of the wa ll since 
its inception. Unlike its jurisprudence with regard to state aid to religiously 
affiliated non-public schools, which has allowed more or less assistance 
primarily depending on the composition of the High Court Bench, the J us- J j 
tices have consistently opposed any kind of state-sponsored prayer and/or 
religious activity in schools. --
The Supreme Court's modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence with 
regard to state aid in the context of K-12 educatioo....e.YOlved through three _ 
hases. Q..illigg the fi~~_which began with Everson, and ended with 
Boara of Education v Allen,13 the Justices upheld a state law mandat-
ing the loans of textbooks in secular subjects for students in religiously 
affi liated non-public schools, the Court enunciated the Child Benefit Test 
which is premised on the notion that such aid primarily benefits chil-
dren rather that their religiously affiliated non-public schools. The years 
between Lemon v. Kurtzman,14 in 1971 and Aguilar v. Felton,15 in 1985 
in which the Court struck down the on-site delivery of Title I services to 
students in their religiously affiliated non-public schools, were the low 
point as to the Chi ld Benefit Test as the Justices refused to move beyond 
the limits they created in Everson and Allen. However, starting in 1993 
with Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,16 in which the Court 
permitted the on-site delivery of specia l education services to a student in 
his religiously affiliated non-public high school, the Justices reinvigorated 
the Child Benefit Test. 
~~==========~==============~-=~ 
-----;:--=- --------'_._-
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Beginning!? with Engel v. Vitale,! 8 in 1962 its first case on prayer in 
public schools, the Supreme Court has consis~ently invalidated attempts 
at bringing religion into public education, striking down such practices 
as prayer and BIble readmg,19 the POSting of the Ten Commandments in 
c1assrooms, 20 a moment of silence,21 and graduation prayer. 22 The Court 
also struck down student-led prayer at school-sponsored activities such as 
high school football games. 23 In addition, federal circuits are split as to 
whether students can lead prayer at graduations. 24 In fairness, the Court 
upheld student-organized prayer and Bible study clubs under the Equal 
Access Act25 while. allowing outside religious groups to use school facili-
ties if they are ava~lable to other, non-religious, groups, 26 a precedent that 
may be in dispute m lIght of the Court's ruling in Christian Legal Society, 
discussed in more detaIl below. 
Along with the cases discussed below, lower federal courts, often affirm-
ing the actions of educational officials, have struck down a wide array of 
Ij religiOUS, specifically Christian: activities in schools. Among these instances, 
lower courts ruled that educatIOnal officials could prohibIt a student from 
, writing a biography about Jesus as a historical figure since she failed to 
follow her teacher's directions in completing the assignment; 2? found that 
educators did not violate a second-grade student's First Amendment rights 
to freedom of religion in preventing her from showing a videotape of her-
self singing a religious song to classmates during show-and-tell;28 ordered 
a high school student to remove Christian religious messages from a mural 
she painted as part of a school-wide beautification project;29 and prevented 
a board from allowing a public school graduation to occur in a church 
which displayed an array of Christian symbols on the basis that doing so 
would appear as an endorsement of Christianity. 30 
Constitutional uncertainty over the place of prayer and/or religious activ-
'I- ity in schools can be traced to Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon), the Court's 
most significant case in the history of church-state relations. In Lemon, 
the Court invalidate~ statutes from Pennsylvania that called for the pur- j 
chase of secular servICes and Rhode Island that basically provIded salary 
supplements for teachers in religiously affiliated non-public schools. In its 
far-reaching opinion, the Court relied on two of its then recent decisions in 
creating the seemingly ubiquitous tripartite Lemon test. The Court com-
bined the two-part purpose and effect test that it created in School District 
of Abington Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett,1! invalidating 
prayer and Bible reading in public schools by adding the excessive entangle-
ment test from Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New, 32 wherein 
it upheld a law which provided state property tax exemptions for church 
property used in worship services. The Court wrote that: 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumu-
lative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests 
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one 
Does the Free Exercise of Religion Have a Future? 5 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." 33 
The difficulty with L emon results in part from the fact that it i~ 
mixed metaphQr thCli traces its origins to cases involving both the Estab-
lishmenLand Free..Exe.rdSe:::c auses MOre -specifically, Lemon's first two 
parts were developed in the context of a dispute over prayer and Bible 
reading in public schools while the third arose in a disagreement over tax 
exemptions, essentially governmental aid, to religious institutions. Yet, 
the judiciary applies the Lemon test widely, almost indiscriminately, in 
disputes whether involving aid to religious institutions or prayer and reli-
gious activities and public schools. 
When the Supreme Court applies the Lemon test in cases regardless of 
whether they involve aid or religious activity, its failure to explain how, or 
why, it is a kind of "one size fits aU" meaSUl;e to resolve disputes originatin.g 
under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, creates confusion 
for those seeking- judicial cl~rity, if n;t consistency. Moreover, despite the 
Court's occasional dissatisfaction with the increasingly unworkable Lemon 
test, it has yet to discard it in favor of a more manageable vehicle for evalu-
ating prayer and religious activity in public schools, not to mention aid to 
students and their religiously affiliated non-public schools. 
Confusion generated by the Lemon test is exacerbated because as mem-
bership on the Supreme Court changes, its collective jurisprudence on the 
status of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is impacted. The 
Court's jurisprudence with regard to the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses has been subject to modification through the creation of two later 
tests. In the earlier of these two tests, Lynch v. Donnelly,34 a non-school 
case, the Court permitted a Christmas display including Santa's house, a 
Christmas tree, and a Nativity scene on public property. 
In a concurrence in Lynch, Justice O'Connor enunciated her "endorse-
ment test" under which "[e]ndorsement sends a message to non-adherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members 
of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."35 She 
added that, "irrespective of government's actual purpose, [if] the practice 
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. ... 
[a court] should render the challenged practice invalid."36 Relying on this 
test, Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Santa Fe Independent School Dis-
trict v. Doe3? struck down prayer before high school football games in part 
based on his assertion that school officials appeared to endorse religion. 
Subsequently, in Lee v. Weisman, 38 a case prohibiting prayer at pub-
lic school graduation ceremonies, Justice Kennedy, author of the Supreme 
Court's majority opinion, enunciated the so-called psychological coercion 
test. In this test, the Court feared that allowing governmental officials to 
select individuals to lead prayers at the start of graduation ceremonies could 
result in psychological coercion of students who, as a captive audience may 
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have been forced, against their wishes, to participate in events, and were 
not genuinely free to be excused from attending. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge that the L emon test presents arises under 
its second prong. Under this standard, any governmental action must have a 
"principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."39 Yet, 
I 
in focusing on avoiding the advancement of religion, and largely ignoring prac-
tices that have the practical effect of inhibiting religious freedom, the courts 
have contributed significantly to attempts ~ex<::1ude religion in:!.J2IQP_erlyJrow, 
a wide array of educational activities. Against the preceding cases, the Court 
recently demonstrated how its confused Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
is in a state of flux with religious freedom hanging in the balance. 
SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION: HOSTILITY OR INDIFFERENCE? 
Insofar as the Supreme Court's rulings in Christian Legal Society and Hosan-
na-Tabor are reviewed in great deal in Chapter 7, this section presents a brief 
review of these cases so as to put them into context on the status of religious 
freedom. These cases are discussed here, along with Windsor, due to their 
potential impact on the Court's evolving First Amendment jurisprudence ¥1d 
by extension, the rights of all Americans to practice their faiths freely. t/ 
Christian Legal Society40 saw a divided Supreme Court affirm that offi-
cials at a public law school in California could implement a policy requiring 
1,n on-campus religious group to admit all comers from the student body, including those who disagreed with its beliefs, as a condition of becoming 
a recognized student organization. The upshot is that religious groups are 7 
faced with the unpalatable options of admitting individual who share their I 
goals in order to gain officials recognition or go off campus and forego aid 
in an attempt to maintain organizational purity. 
In Hosanna-Tabor,41 a rare unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court 
rejected an order of the EEOC requiring officials at a Lutheran school in 
Missouri to re-employ a female teacher who was dismissed due to an ill-
ness and for being a disruptive influence on the staff. The Court noted 
that school officials regarded the teacher as "called," meaning that she was 
called to her vocation by God. Since the teacher was essentially a ministerial 
employee, the Court agreed that school officials had freedom in the inter-
play between the Establi shment and Free Exercise Clauses to safeguard the 
school's religious liberty in selecting their own ministers. In other words, 
the Court protected the school's religious freedom by agreeing that Church 
leaders and, by extension, officials of faith-based institutions, retain the 
freedom to apply their religious values in making hiring decisions as to who 
can serve, or be identified, as ministers. 
In United States v. Windsor,42 some of Justice Kennedy'S comments as 
author of the Supreme Court's majority's opinion in a five-to-four order 
invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)43 send warning signals 
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for religious leaders about the status of the Free Exercise Clause.44 He wrote 
that "[i]n determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus 
or purpose, ' [d]iscriminations of an unusual character' ... require care-
ful consideration."45 Justice Scalia took strong exception to part of Justice 
Kennedy's unnecessarily provocative perspective in which the latter wrote 
"that the supporters of this Act acted with malice-with the 'purpose' 'to 
disparage and to injure' same-sex couples."46 
Readily conceding that an analysis of same-sex marriage is beyond the 
scope of this chapter and volume, it is important for proponents on both sides 
of the issue to recognize that there must be room to display mutual respect 
for one another based on the aphorism that people can disagree but do not 
have to be disagreeable in doing so. At the same time, supporters of same-sex 
marriage, such as Justice Kennedy who has an influential position as a mem-
ber of the Supreme Court, should not impute a discriminatory animus on the 
part of all who disagree with his position, especially when differences emerge 
for those whose concerns are rooted in sincerely held religious beliefs . 
In light of Windsor it is worth considering its potential impact on main-
stream religious bodies that do not support same-sex marriage due to their 
teachings, and their schools. Further questions may arise about the treat-
ment of religious bodies that refuse to ordain non-celibate gays (or women, 
for that matter, an admittedly different topic) as members of their clergy. 
In other words, subject to the discussion in the next paragraph, it remains 
to be seen whether religious institutions will have to modify the content of 
their curricular or hiring practices. 
A partial answer to this conundrum raised by Windsor may emerge from 
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society Inter-
national (Allianc e),47 resolved in the same term as Windsor. In Alliance the 
Supreme Court ruled that the constitutionality of a condition on receiving a 
subsidy, or in terms more applicable to religious institutions such as schools 
and churches or other houses of worship, tax exemptions for themselves and 
tax deductions for donors, depend s on whether the condition imposed by 
the government defines or reaches outside of programs. That is, it appears 
that according to Alliance, public officials cannot impose requirements on 
religious organizations that would change their very nature, such as expect 
them to change their doctrines and practices since these to the heart of their 
sincerely held religious beliefs. Of course, it is unclear remains whether 
Alliance may be used to protect religious organizations . 
REFLECTIONS 
Against a backdrop of Christian Legal Society, Hosanna-Tabor, and Wind-
sor, it is evident that the way in which educators and the judiciary clarify the 
place of prayer and/or religious activity in schools will have a major impact 
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the following three questions, the manner in which this debate plays out 
will reveal whether the nation still cherishes the freedom of religion that 
contributed so greatly to its foundation. 
The first question involves the effect prong in Lemon. More specifi-
cally, if the United States is to continue fostering ongoing dialogue about 
diversity of perspectives, it is imperative that the Supreme Court provide 
guidance for the remainder of the federal judiciary as well as school offi-
cia ls in order to avoid the appearance of inhibiting religion, especially 
in the aftermath of three recent cases that have been less than favorable 
to expressions of religious belief. In the first case, C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. 
Oliva,48 school officials in New Jersey forbade a first-grader from read-
ing a religious story, "Big Fami ly," an adaptation of the Biblical story 
of Jacob and Esau to classmates. Although the court fai led to reach the 
merits of the claim, since it resolved the matter on procedural grounds, 
the outcome is perplexing. 
In the second case, Skros v. City of New York,49 the Second Circuit 
upheld a policy from the board of education that allowed displays of meno-
rahs and stars and crescents, representing Judaism and Islam respectively, 
but not a manger scene. Since the Court refused to permit the display of the 
manger on the basis that it was wholly religious, one must wonder whether 
secular jurists are in a position to delineate between religious iconography 
of different faiths, especially since Judaism and Islam forbid the use of stat-
utes in their faiths. 
Finally, in a case from California, Eklund v. Byron Union School 
District, SO the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, again on procedural 
grounds, of a challenge from parents in California who questioned the 
use of curricular materials on Islam. The materia ls included a simulation 
unit on Islamic culture in a social studies course that, among other things, 
required students to wear identification tags displaying their new Islamic 
names, dress as Muslims, memorize and recite an Islamic prayer that has 
the status of the Lord 's Prayer in Christianity as well as other verses from 
the Quran, recite the Five Pillars of Faith, and engage in fasting and acts 
of self-denial. sl Without addressing the merits of the claims, the court 
determined that the activities "were not ... 'overt religious exercises' that 
raise[dJ Establishment Clause concerns."S2 
It is unclear how ordering the removal of a chi ld 's drawings or permit-
ting him to read a religious story in C.H. or permitting symbols that are 
closely associated with Islam and Judaism, but not Christianity, in Skoros 
or having children act as if they were Islamic in Ek lund, are anything but j inconsistent, if not h.Q.stile to Christianity, since they display a lack of even-
handedness, to say the least. C.H. is particularly troubling because it is 
unclear how educators officials could have thought that a chi ld 's desire to 
read a religious story to his classmates, even if spurred on by his mother, 
could have been attributed to the school board. Further, how the Second 
Circuit in Skoros, backed by attorneys and other school officia ls from the 
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New York City Board of Education, could claim that both the menorah 
a~d star and crescent are wholly secular is nothing short of astounding, 
rejecting the religious significance that these objects have long held. Skoros 
dbemonstrates a clear lack of even-handedness in addressing religious sym-
ols and is exacerbated by the fact that the court took it upon itself to be 
~he arbiter of the meaning of the iconographic images at issue, compound-
Ing the educators' lack of religious understanding that was evidenced in the 
board's wrong-headed policy. As Justice Scalia noted in Lee, one cannot 
help but wonder whether secular jurists "cannot disguise the fact that the[y 
have] gone beyond the realm where judges know what they are doing,"53 
In acting essentially as religious arbiters by passing judgment in areas well 
beyond their competence. 
Lip service over the importance of respect for differences of opinion 
aside, educators and the courts must allow educational leaders in schools to 
practice what they preach and do more than merely talk about inculcating 
different values . At a time when values occupy a prominent role in public 
debate, one can only wonder what message children receive in their class-
rooms when the courts have permitted school officials to ensure that their 
schools are virtually sanitized of references to prayer and religion other 
than 'appropriate' discussions in history or English classes. By imposing a 
wall of silence that prevents believers from exercising their constitutional 
rights, educators and the courts risk sending out the unmistakable message 
to children and parents that freedom of religion is little more than a pious 
platitude that can be freely ignored without consequence. 
A second, closely related question concerns the paradox of how a dem-
ocratic society that was founded on religious principles but continues to 
preserve the Jeffersonian metaphor by maintaining the 'wall of separation' 
between church and state with regard to prayer and/or religious activities, 
can respect the rights of both the majority and minority. In other words, 
while certainly agreeing with Justice O'Connor's salient observation that 
"we do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment,"54 in pro-
tecting the rights of the minority with regard to such potentially conten-
tious matters as prayer and religious activity in schools, it remains to be 
seen how the courts can avoid the tyranny of the minority. 55 Therefore, 
finding an acceptable middle ground is essential. 
When the Supreme Court struck down school-sponsored graduation 
prayer in Lee v. Weisman, the majority spoke of a "mutuality of obligation"56 
that safeguards the rights of minorities . If this "mutuality of obligation" is 
to have meaning, then public school officials and the courts must find a 
way to accommodate the viewpoints of all, rather than stifle the religious 
expression of believers. One can only question how educators expect to 
foster an appreciation of diversity in all of its manifestations beyond such 
demographic characteristics as race, gender, and socio-economic status if 
school officials cannot tolerate expressions of religious beliefs that may not 
be shared by all members of an audience or community. 
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v It is ironic that in a nation that values freedom of religion, the courts have 
been unable to reach a consensus on the appropriateness of public prayer 
and religious activity. Further, protestations to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, schools teach values regularly, whether informing children not to cheat, 
to study and work hard, not to fight, and to drink their milk. While readily 
conceding that the inculcation of religious values is a familial obligation that 
, is best done at home, one can only wonder what message students, especially 
I those from the homes of believers, receive when they are told that they cannot 
I discuss religion in school. This chapter recognizes that ~eas.onable observers 
cannot help but to thInk that the message is of one rejectIng religIOn. The 
notion that there can be no discussion of religion in schools is dubious at 
best, disingenuous at worst in light of dicta in School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett that: 
It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary 
and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such 
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of 
a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with 
the First Amendment. 57 
Judicial inability to formulate a measure that respects the rights of diverse 
groups of believers is frustrating where educators have, as in Lee, included 
well-reasoned safeguards such as selecting a religious leader from a dif-
ferent faith each year and providing broad-based guidelines under which 
prayers may be offered. 
The Supreme Court's failure to respond adequately to Justice Scalia's 
salient dissent in Lee that silence in response to public prayer does not 
necessarily mean assent has further exacerbated the situation.58 By Silently/ 
0 istening to and perhaps even reflecting on whatever prayer is being offered, 
or if a different point of view is being presented, listeners can develop a I deeper respect for perspectives other than their own, thereby enhancing the ; 
presence of intellectual diversity in schools (and other locales). If students 
'- can learn to maintain such a respectful stance, whether in silence as at the 
graduation, or by engaging in appropriate discussion should such matters 
arise in classroom settings, when exposed to ideas with which they dis-
agree, then it could be that they, and the adults present, may have learned 
a valuable lesson in tolerance. 
In a nation where freedom of religion has been part of its fabric since its 
founding, whether its future is in some doubt or litigation over its parameters 
is the continuation of what can be described as business as usual remains 
to be seen. Even so, the following chapters describe the leading issues in a 
wide array of disputes relating religious freedom in the United States while 
highlighting its status in selected nations throughout the world. The large 
amount of litigation relating to religion in the public marketplace in educa-
tion that has been litigated generally peacefully in the United States stands 
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in stark contrast to the situation in much of the rest of the world, includ-
ing some of the countries discussed in the second half of the book, where 
religious differences are often responded to amid violence. Hopefully, then, 
the issues examined in this volume will provide readers with a better under-
standing of religious freedom in the United States and its status in selected 
nations throughout the world. 
NOTES 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. In Cantwe LL v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) wherein the Justices struck 
down the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for violating a statute aga inst 
the solicitation of funds for religious, charitable, or philanthropic purposes 
without prior approval of public officials, the Court extended the prohibition 
against the establishment of religion to state governments. 
3. For a review of these documents, see Charles J. Russo, Religious Freedom 
in Education: A Fundamental Human Right. RELIGION & EDUCATION (in 
press). 
4. For a d·iscussion of the attitudes of Supreme Court Justices on International 
law, see Charles J. Russo, Judges as Umpires or Rule Makers? The Role of 
the Judiciary in Educational Decision Making in the United States. 10 EDU-
CATION LAW JOURNAL 33 at n.50-70 (2009) and accompanying text. 
5. 330 U.S. 1 (1947), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947). 
6. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), reh'g denied, 
on remand sub nom. Ch1'istian Legal Soc'y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 
2010) . 
7. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2011). 
8. -U.S.-, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
9. The metaphor of the "wall of separation" was popularized by Thomas Jef-
ferson's letter of January 1,1802, to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, 
and Stephen S. Nelson, "A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association: 
Thomas Jefferson," in Andrew Adgate Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh, 
(eds .), 16 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (1903) 281. Jefferson wrote: "their 
legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation 
between church and state." The metaphor of the wall traces its origins to 
Roger Wi lliams who coined the term more than 150 years before Thomas 
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